If happiness is relative, against whom do we compare ourselves? Implications for labour supply by Pérez-Asenjo, Eduardo
If happiness is relative, against whom do we compare
ourselves? Implications for labour supply
Eduardo Pérez-Asenjo
Abstract This paper addresses two important issues: the nature of the refer-
ence group to which individuals compare themselves, and the implications of
social comparisons for labour supply. It identifies age as the main characteristic
defining the reference group. Race, sex and religion are other relevant features
in its determination. It provides micro-level evidence that social comparisons
influence the hours an individual works. Specifically, if her income is lower
than her reference group income, she will work more. It also shows that for
males, white people and people living in rural areas the effect of relative
income on both happiness and labour supply is greater.
Keywords Happiness · Labour supply · Relative income
JEL Classification D01 · D19 · J22
E. Pérez-Asenjo (B)
Chief Economist Team, Spanish Competition Authority, Barquillo 5, 28004, Madrid, Spain
e-mail: eperez@cncompetencia.es
E. Pérez-Asenjo
Economics Department, University Carlos III, Getafe, Madrid, Spain
1
1 Introduction
Everybody wants to be happy. We want money (or anything else) only as a
means to increase our happiness. If having more money does not substantially
increase our happiness, then money is not very important, but happiness is. It
could be argued that while happiness is important per se, economic things only
count as long as they make people happier.
The behaviourist revolution in psychology and the ordinalism revolution in
economics in the 1930s pushed the study of happiness further and further out of
sight. While psychologists have returned with strength to the study of feelings
(explaining, measuring and comparing them across people), economics now
starts to look to the issue of happiness. Richard Easterlin (1973, 1974) was the
first to call economists attention to survey data that illuminate the relationship
between material living standards and subjective well-being. He noted that
despite huge growth in real per capita income in several countries after World
War II, individual happiness measured in different surveys had not increased.
However, he also found evidence that at a given point in time, and within a
particular country, persons with higher income were happier. His pathbreaking
contribution was not followed then, but in recent years, some economists are
trying to solve what has been called the Easterlin paradox. This is opening the
way to an extremely attractive new field of research.
In traditional economic models, higher income expands individuals’ oppor-
tunity set and as more goods and services can be consumed, it leads inevitably
to higher levels of utility. Thus, we need an expanded model if we are to
explain what is happening. We need to incorporate the standard findings of
modern psychology. The most obvious of these is the fact that we compare
our incomes with those of others. Then, the answer could be that riches do
bring happiness, provided that you are richer than other people. It is not the
absolute level of income that matters most but rather one’s position relative
to other individuals. The question of getting ahead in the income hierarchy
depends in part on how many hours the individual supplies in the labour
market. Working more hours at the expense of leisure time may well decrease
happiness. Therefore, if the quest for relative standing make people work more
hours (which increases income but decreases happiness), it can explain the
Easterlin paradox. Thus, a sensible hypothesis is to test if relative income or
position can affect both happiness and labour supply.
Furthermore, there is another reason to study the effect of relative income
on happiness and labour supply together in the same paper. The effect of
relative income on labour supply may be due to network or informational
concerns. Job information transmission within a social network can make an
individual’s reference group income informative about her own future income
prospects. According to this alternative view, if the individual’s reference
group income increases, the individual will react to this opportunity signal
redoubling her efforts to attain a higher income. Thus, we can observe the same
positive relation between other’s income and own hours of work correspond-
ing to two alternative interpretations, relative deprivation or signal effects.
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Self-reported well-being data may allow for discrimination between these
competing explanations. If the income of the reference group is negatively
related to individual happiness, it suggests the social comparisons explanation,
while if the relation is positive, it would point to the signal effect. In this
latter case, it also would demonstrate the so-called Hirschamn’s ‘tunnel-effect’
(Hirschman and Rothschild 1973): people can derive utility from other’s higher
income if they consider it to be informative about their own future income.
As we will see in the next section, the majority of the growing literature
which reviews the relationship between income and happiness finds a negative
relation between other’s income and own happiness (see, for example, Ferrer-
i-Carbonell 2005). However, in some papers (see, for example, Senik 2004)
it is found a positive relation, which the authors attribute to the Hirschamn’s
‘tunnel-effect’. In this paper I find a significant negative relation between the
income of the reference groups and individual happiness. Hence the effect on
labour supply, if any, would arise as a consequence of social comparisons.
In the second part of the paper, I find that, indeed, relative income has a
significant effect on the amount of labour an individual is willing to supply. As
expected, if the income of an individual is below the income of her reference
group, she will work more hours to surpass, catch or keep up with them.
A crucial question in all this analysis is to identify the nature of the reference
groups. The reference group is defined as the group of people an individual
looks onto when making social comparisons. In the first part of the paper,
making use of the valuable information contained in the self-reported well-
being data, I identify the characteristics that define the reference group. The
reference groups defined by these characteristics are then used in the second
part of the paper in the estimation of the relative income effect on labour
supply. This second part is relevant not only for the implications for labour
supply but also as a validity test for the conclusions of the first part and the
reliability of self-reported happiness data.
2 The long history of social comparisons
There is a large literature in sociology and psychology that acknowledges the
fact that social comparisons affect individual happiness. In sociology, we can
find the concepts of relative deprivation, relative status and social frame of
reference. What these concepts share is the notion that individuals operate
within reference groups. Even within the field of economics, these factors have
been taken into account. Nobel prize winner Gary Becker’s (1974) famous
article A Theory of Social Interactions finished contrasting Thorstein Veblen
and Adam Smith’s views of the world. If there were a rise in all incomes in
a community by the same percentage, would it improve a typical person’s
welfare? In Smith’s world the answer would be yes, while in Veblen’s world the
answer would be no. The negative comes from Veblen’s belief that the welfare
of a typical person primarily depends on her relative income position, and a
rise in the environment and own income by the same percentage wouldn’t
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have changed this relative position.1 Following his argument in the same book
Veblen fashioned the notion of conspicuous consumption, serving to impress
other persons. In fact, Smith himself believed that the primary purpose of
wealth-accumulation beyond a minimal level was not for consumption, but
for the social attention.2 In 1949 Duesenberry formulated the relative income
hypothesis which asserts that individual utility depends both on absolute and
relative income. Following this line of thought, the models of interdependent
preferences (see, for example, Pollak 1976) assume that agents derive utility
from what one achieves in comparison with others. Thus, individual happiness
and satisfaction depend not only on the material achievements and income in
absolute terms but also on one’s relative position.
The recent growth of the empirical literature on happiness and income
supply much information in this respect. The majority of these articles coincide
in signaling a negative and significant relationship between own happiness
and other’s income. Nonetheless, there are three papers which find a pos-
itive happiness effect from other’s income. Senik (2004), using the Russian
Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS), explains this positive relation as
an information or tunnel effect. She argues that other’s higher incomes may
be considered informative about own future income, thus increasing current
happiness. In Senik (2008) she finds a positive effect in new eastern European
post-transition countries and in the United States, while the effect is negative
in old western European countries. She argues that the information effect
is higher in high uncertainty countries (new Europe) and in high mobility
countries (US). Finally, Kingdon and Knight (2007) find a positive relation
between happiness and income of others in the local residential area, while
the effect is negative when the reference group is widened to include the
whole district. They explain it in terms of altruism or fellow-feeling in a close
community.
By contrast, the rest of this burgeoning literature points directly to the
negative influence of other’s income on happiness and attributes it to social
comparison considerations. The evidence is consistent along various countries
and robust to different definitions of the reference groups.3 In American data,
Luttmer (2005) using the National Survey of Families and Households and
1‘The desire for wealth can scarcely be satiated in any individual instance, and evidently a satiation
of the average or general desire for wealth is out of the question. However widely, or equally,
or foully, it may be distributed, no general increase of the community’s wealth can make any
approach to satiating this need, the ground of which is the desire of everyone to excel everyone else
in the accumulation of goods’ (Veblen 1899, my italics).
2‘What are the advantages which we propose by that great purpose of human life which we call
bettering our condition?’ Smith asked. “To be observed, to be attended to, to be taken notice of with
sympathy, complacency, and approbation, are all the advantages which we can propose to derive
from it. It is the vanity, not the ease, or the pleasure, which interests us.”(Smith 1759, my italics).
3For a detailed summary see the literature surveys in Frey and Stutzer (2002), Layard (2005a) and
Clark et al. (2008). In the sphere of job satisfaction, instead of happiness, the evidence also points
to a negative effect of other’s income. See Clark and Oswald (1996), and Sloane and Williams
(2000), using British data, or Lévy-Garboua and Montmarquette (2004) using Canadian data.
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the Census, finds a negative relation using the neighbours as the reference
group. McBride (2001) and Blanchflower and Oswald (2004) use the same data
used in this paper, the US General Social Survey (GSS). McBride presents an
empirical analysis to test for the effect of own income, past financial situation
and comparison income on self-reported happiness. He defines comparison
income as average earnings of the individual’s cohort. He finds a negative
correlation between happiness and both comparison income and the financial
situation of the parents. Blanchflower and Oswald study the effect on sub-
jective well-being of different variables such as age, race or sex. They also
report a negative correlation between subjective well-being and comparison
income. Their comparison income is defined as the average income in the state
where the individual lives. My findings are in line with the results of these
two articles and hence contrary to Senik (2008).4 I provide evidence that there
is a strong negative and statistically significant link between happiness and
reference group income for all the reference groups considered. Therefore,
I do not find evidence of information or tunnel effects, and I provide support
for the existence and relevance of social comparisons.
All these studies treat people’s reference groups as given. They impose a
particular reference group, and then prove that the income of this group is neg-
atively and significantly correlated with the happiness of the individual. Two
exceptions that employs respondent-defined rather than researcher-defined
reference groups are Melenberg (1992) and Knight et al. (2006). Melenberg
uses 1985 and 1986 Dutch Socio-Economic Panel data in which individuals
were asked about the ‘people whom they meet frequently’. He shows that the
average income of this people had a positive effect on income aspirations
(proxied by the amount of income considered good or adequate). Knight
et al. directly asks 9,200 Chinese rural households against whom they compare
themselves. Respondents were given eight possibilities geographically enlarg-
ing, from neighbours to people in China as a whole.5 Almost 30% chose their
neighbours, while almost 40% selected fellows in their own village to be their
reference group.
Thus, despite the overwhelming evidence of the influence of compari-
son income on happiness, little is known about the characteristics and the
definition of the group to which individuals compare themselves. In this paper,
once I check that relative income matters for happiness, I try to identify
the characteristics which define the reference group. In a similar fashion,
Senik (2009) evaluates the relative importance of different types of benchmark
using the Life in Transition Survey (a cross-section survey of all countries of
the former socialist bloc). She finds that internal comparisons to one’s own
past living standard outweigh any other comparison benchmark. Nonetheless,
4A possible explanation for the opposing results among the papers may lie in the composition
of the reference groups, which in Senik (2008) are specially constructed to contain information
effects.
5Specifically, the eight possibilities are neighbours, relations, fellow-villagers, people in township,
people in county capital, people in cities, people in China as a whole, and difficult to say.
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external comparisons are also relevant, and she shows that local comparisons
(to one’s parents, former colleagues or high school mates) are more powerful
than self-ranking in the social ladder. In this paper, I only deal with external
references and comparing their relative importance I conclude that age, race,
sex and religion are the most relevant characteristics defining the reference
groups.
In a related line of research, there is a growing recognition in some recent
macroeconomic literature of the role of positional concerns in consumption.
A widely used model giving emphasis to positional concerns is the keeping up
with the Joneses model (see, for example, Gali 1994). This model assumes that
agents derive utility from their own consumption as well as from the difference
or comparison between their own and aggregate per capita consumption. We
rely on this general framework to study the implications of social comparisons
for hours worked. In particular, I am more precise since I make use of the
Joneses found in the first part to test their importance on labour supply.
There are a few previous papers that have examined the role of relative
income in labour supply. Both Neumark and Postlewaite (1998) and Park
(2005) study if the women’s decisions to seek paid employment depend on the
employment decisions of other people with whom relative income comparisons
might be important. Neumark and Postlewaite report that women’s employ-
ment decisions are positively related to their sisters’ employment decisions.
Park finds evidence that married women are more likely to be in labour force
when their husbands’ relative income is low. In a related work, Bowles and
Park (2005) show that greater inequality predicts longer average work hours,
using country-level macro data on work hours in OECD countries, which they
attribute to comparison or Veblen effects. Stark and Taylor (1989, 1991) find
that relative income plays a significant role in international migration from
Mexico to United States. Individuals who can keep other people in their poorer
country of origin as their reference group are more likely to migrate than those
who will compare with their richer new neighbours.
In this paper I follow both lines of research, and I provide evidence that
relative income is a significant variable to explain both happiness and labour
supply. The negative effect of the reference group income on happiness and
the positive effect on labour supply indicate that social comparisons are the
cause of both effects. If social comparisons exist and affect human feelings and
behaviour, the next natural question to be asked is, against whom do we com-
pare ourselves? In this article I identify the main characteristics defining the
Joneses. The paper shows that the reference group against which the individual
can evaluate himself is primarily defined by age, while other relevant features
are race, sex and religion. Besides, it identifies the groups who care more about
social comparisons. The effect of relative income on both happiness and labour
supply is greater for males, white people and people living in the country.
Finally, the paper includes three different measures of relative income to test
the hypothesis of social comparison effects. One of them is referred to income
rank, which is not usually tested in this literature, and I provide empirical
evidence for its importance on individual happiness.
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3 Data
Despite the increasing number of studies revised in the previous section
which use subjective survey data, there are still justifiable concerns among
economists about the use of self-reported measures of well-being. Reported
subjective well-being may depend on the order of questions, the phrasing of
questions, the scales applied, the respondent’s mood at the time of the survey,
the selection of information processed or the context in which the survey is
conducted (see Bertrand and Mullainathan 2001; Ravallion and Lokshin 2001).
However, a growing evidence from both economists and psychologists shows
that these measures of individual well-being contain ‘substantial amounts of
valid variance’,6 and are predictive of observable behaviour.
Well-being data pass what psychologists often call validation exercises since
they are correlated with observable phenomena. For example, people who
report higher happiness scores tend to laugh and smile more, are more likely
to be rated as happy by friends, have relatively greater electrical activity in
the left prefrontral region of the brain7 and correlate negatively with heart
rate and blood pressure measures of responses to stress.8 Besides, different
measures of well-being correlate well with one another. Therefore, the existing
research suggests that what the psychologists call subjective well-being is
a real phenomenon and the data which asks about it are reliable enough
for the econometrical work. Moreover, as already noted, two of the papers
commented in the previous section (McBride 2001; Blanchflower and Oswald
2004) use the same survey used in this paper, the US General Social Survey
(GSS).
The GSS is a survey of US households conducted by the National Opinion
Research Center in almost every year between 1972 and 1993,9 and every
other year since 1994. Each survey is an independently drawn sample of
persons aged 18 or over living in the US, who are personally interviewed. I
use the cumulative data file, prepared by the Roper Center for Public Opinion
Research, which merges all the years of the GSS into a single file.
The individuals sampled are different each year, so the cumulative data file
is not a panel but 25 different cross sections corresponding to the 25 years.
For the first years of the survey there are around 1,500 observations per year,
while there are roughly 3,000 observations for the latest years beginning in
1994, when the survey became biannual. We have data for 46,510 individuals
about a very wide range of variables, including happiness, individual and family
income, hours worked, sociodemographic characteristics, union membership
6In the words of the most cited psychologist in this field, Ed Diener (1984, p. 551).
7The left prefrontal region of the brain is rich in receptors for the neurotransmitter dopamine,
higher concentrations of which have been shown to be correlated with positive affect.
8For surveys of this evidence see Frank (1985b, Chapter 2) and Clark and Oswald (1996). A more
thorough discussion of the realibility of self-reported happiness data is included in Frey and Stutzer
(2002) and Clark et al. (2008).
9The survey was not conducted in the years 1979, 1981 and 1992.
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and health condition. Thus, these data allow to further include a large set of
control variables related to individual sociodemographic and socioeconomic
characteristics, which may significantly explain some of individual’s general
satisfaction. The GSS, except for the US Census, is the most frequently
analysed source of information in the social sciences, so it needs no further
explanation.
The summary statistics of the most relevant variables of our sample are
presented in Table A1 in the Appendix 2 (see Supplementary material). For
the variables I have chosen that could define the reference groups, I present the
number of observations of each category for the two main estimations in this
paper, the one for happiness and the one for hours worked. These variables are
race, sex, place of living, marital status, work status, religion, political views,
occupation, education, prestige, age and region. In this table we can see the
heterogeneity of the respondents which shows that the GSS is a representative
sample survey of the adult American population.
The dependent variable in the first part of the analysis, happiness, is
extracted from the following question, ‘Taken all together, how would you
say things are these days: would you say that you are very happy, pretty
happy, or not too happy?’. In the paper, the responses are coded as (3) Very
Happy, (2) Pretty Happy, and (1) Not too Happy.10 Thus, we observe three
discrete response outcomes coming from the question, which make it suitable
to use the methodology explained in the next section. In general, we can see
that American people have considered themselves pretty happy along these
previous years: 32% of the respondents answer that they are very happy, more
that 55% answer that they are pretty happy, while 12% of those interviewed
in the GSS describe themselves as not too happy. For both individual and
family income respondents did not record exact income figure, but were asked
to identify the income range they fell into. These quantities are in constant
dollars with base in 1986. In the question about health, respondents are asked
to answer if they consider their condition of health to be excellent, good, fair
or poor. The average is very close to the answer good.
4 Model for happiness
Most basic models used in the micro theory of consumption and production
assume that individual utility functions are not influenced by the behaviour
of others. In contrast, major parts of psychology and sociology assume that
preferences of economic agents, and then happiness, are partly determined by
comparison with relevant others. We assume the relative income hypothesis,
a preference hypothesis that states that individuals care about relative income
as well as about the income level itself.
10For ease of interpretation, I have reversed the scaling contained in the GSS, and within the paper
the number 3 represents the highest level of happiness.
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In the light of this hypothesis I write a simple model in which the utility of
the individual depends not only on her own income but also on the income of
her reference group.
u(yi, yi, xi) (1)
where u is utility of an individual, yi is her income, yi is the income of her
reference group and xi is a vector of other variables which affect her utility.
The decision of which variables xi have to be included is based on both the
economic and the psychological literature and on data availability.
It is assumed, as seems plausible, that ui is a function that is observable
only to the individual. Its structure cannot be conveyed unambiguously to the
interviewer or any other individual. The idea used in this paper is that there is
a relation between actual utility (ui) and the happiness expressed in a survey
(Hi), defined by the equation:
Hi = u(yi, yi, xi) + εi (2)
where the error term captures the unobservable heterogeneity across individ-
uals. It includes among other things, the genetic or social factor which make
human beings experience different levels of happiness even facing the same
circumstances, and the inability of individuals to communicate accurately their
happiness level. This approach recognises the economist’s instinctive distrust
of a single person’s subjective happiness.
We observe, as already noted, three discrete response outcomes. The latent
continuous variable is happiness (Hi) and the correspondence with the three
discrete responses in the survey (H∗i ) will be given by:
H∗i =
⎧
⎨
⎩
1 i f Hi < c1
2 i f c1  Hi  c2
3 i f Hi > c2
This structure makes it suitable for estimation by maximum likelihood
using the ordered logit procedure. Through this method the data are treated
ordinally so that higher reported happiness reflects higher happiness of an
individual. Hence I do not assume, as most of the psychological literature
does (which assigns numbers to happiness levels and then uses OLS regression
methods), that the answers to happiness surveys are cardinal and interper-
sonally comparable. Ordinal comparability implies that individuals share a
common opinion of what happiness is. Most of the papers cited in the literature
use ordered latent response models11 rather than OLS. However, Ferrer-i-
Carbonell and Frijters (2004) argue that the use of ordered discrete dependent
variable methods or OLS makes little different to the results.
11Some of them use ordered logits while others estimate ordered probits, which is a trivial
modification of the formulation and makes virtually no difference in practice.
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4.1 Identification of social comparison effects
Studies of social comparison processes (Festinger 1954) suggest that individ-
uals compare themselves primarily to others who are similar or whom they
come into close daily contact. Besides, I consider characteristics related to
social achievement and status, and also characteristics that are relevant to
an individual self-conception as candidates to define the reference groups.
Thus I have chosen twelve different characteristics that divide the human
population in different groups with common features, which make every
group identifiable and distinguishable from the other groups created by the
same characteristic. Hence, they are suitable of becoming a comparison point
against which the individual can evaluate himself. They are: age (people in
intervals of ten years), sex, race (just blacks and whites), educational degree
(with five different categories), region (with nine different regions in USA),
work status (with four different categories), marital status (with four different
categories), occupation (with five different categories), prestige (with five
different categories), religion (with four different categories), political views
(with three different categories), and place of living (people living in the city
versus people living in the country). The definition of the reference groups is
exhaustively revised in Appendix 1 (see Supplementary material).12
The majority of these characteristics also affect individual’s happiness and
thus are included as controls in the equations of the happiness literature.13
Hence, the characteristics that define the reference group have a double effect,
direct and indirect, on individual’s happiness. This generates a problem of
identification as Manski (1993) illustrates. To show the problem I present the
equation to identify the social comparison effects:
Hi = θyi + βg(yi, Zi) + γ´Zi + η´xi + εi (3)
where Hi is happiness of an individual, yi is her income, Zi are characteristics
that define her reference group, g(yi, Zi) is a ‘status function’ which aims to
capture the effect of relative income, and xi are other individual characteristics
which control for other determinants of happiness.
The problem is to delimit the contextual effects (the propensity of an
individual to be more or less happy varies with exogenous characteristics
of her reference group g(yi, Zi), captured by β) and the correlated effects
(the propensity of an individual to be more or less happy varies with the
characteristics which define her reference group (Zi), captured by γ ). I want to
12In some cases, as will be explained below, the limited number of observations determines the
categories into which every characteristic is divided.
13For example, age, sex, race, work characteristics, years of education and marital status are
included as controls in Blanchflower and Oswald (2004), in what they believe to be one of the first
microeconometric happiness equations. Luttmer (2005) also includes religion, and other studies
such as Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2005), McBride (2001) or Helliwell (2002) include a similar set of
controls.
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separate the component of Zi which affects happiness due to social comparison
considerations, so the coefficient of interest will be β.
To make this descomposition possible, i.e., for β and γ to be identified, we
require two conditions:
(1) The only way yi and Zi can jointly affect Hi is directly (captured by θ
and γ , respectively) and through the term of contextual effects (captured
by β). In other words, there is no other term containing yi and Zi which
affects Hi.
(2) The function which captures the contextual effects, g(yi, Zi), must be
nonlinear in Zi because if it were linear there would be a problem of
perfect multicollinearity which would make it impossible to identify β
and γ.
Thus, I have constructed two variables of relative income which have
individual variability and satisfy these conditions. The first variable is the
income of the individual divided by the income of her reference group
(Eq. 4).
Hi = θyi + β yiE(yi/Zi) + γ
´Zi + η´xi + εi (4)
In the literature it is usual just to use the reference group income as the
variable capturing the social comparison effects. However I use the income of
the individual divided by the income of her reference group because it appears
as an argument in the optimal labour supply decision in my model of the second
part. Thus, I test the effects of the same variable on both happiness and labour
supply.
The second variable is the percentile where an individual stays in the income
distribution of her reference group (Eq. 5).
Hi = θyi + βF(yi/Zi) + γ´Zi + η´xi + εi (5)
The issue of income rank has received little direct attention in this context.
However, it seems sensible to think that an individual may be influenced not
just by relative income but by the rank-ordered position (measured by the
percentile) of her income within her reference group. In a recent study, Brown
et al. (2008), using data from the British Workplace Employee Relations
Survey (WERS) show that satisfaction depends upon the ordinal rank of an
individual’s wage within a comparison group. In a more general way, Parducci
(1995) presents the contextual theory of happiness. One of the applications
of this theory is the model known as range-frequency theory which places the
range as the main point of comparison.
To see how the conditions operate, let us see an example using religion
as the defining reference group characteristic. If yi changes, there will be a
direct effect on Hi captured by θ , and an indirect effect through the change in
the reference group income distribution F(yi/Zi) captured by β. This indirect
effect can be interpreted as the positional aspect of income, or the ‘status
return’ from income. It seems reasonable to assume that, for a given yi, the
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coefficient (θ) which captures the direct effect is the same whether you are
protestant, catholic, profess other religion or have no religion. An individual
obtains the same direct marginal utility of income whatever her religious
beliefs. Then, the coefficient associated with the social effects (β) is identified
and will be significant if people of the same religion in the same year compare
themselves, and that comparison affects their happiness.
There are two assumptions implicit in this model. First, I assume there
are no endogenous effects. According to Manski’s (1993) classification, these
would be the effects of the average happiness of the reference group,
E(Hi/Zi). I believe that an individual’s happiness does not depend on the
average happiness of her reference group. When looking to the Joneses we
do not compare ourselves with how happy they are but with how much
money they have. Second, I assume the contextual effects only come from
income and not from leisure. Then, I do not include a measure of relative
leisure, g(Li, Zi). Frank (1985a, 1999) discusses why empirically income or
consumption externalities are more likely than leisure externalities. Solnick
and Hemenway (1998, 2005), and Carlsson et al. (2007), based on their survey
studies, conclude that relative consumption positions are more important
determinants of individual’s welfare than relative leisure positions. In the end,
the hypothesis I am testing is that an individual compares herself with her
reference group in terms of money earned or relative position in the rat race,
not in happiness nor leisure.
5 Results for happiness
5.1 Importance of relative income on happiness
I start making a regression with all the possible characteristics defining the
reference groups without taking into account social comparison effects to
assess their significance in the determination of happiness. In Table A2 in
Appendix 2 (see Supplementary material) we see these total effects, from
which I want to separate the component which corresponds to social com-
parison considerations. We can see that these effects do not present surprises
to the connoisseur of the happiness literature.14 Reported levels of happiness
are higher among women, whites, retired or those who profess a religion. On
the contrary, being unemployed, widowed, divorced or separated has a large
negative coefficient on reported levels of happiness.
If any of the possible Zi is not significant in this first regression, it is a signal
against the existence of social comparison effects on the basis of that character-
istic. Nevertheless, it might be not significant because of cancelling out effects
14See, for example, Oswald (1997), Helliwell (2002), Blanchflower and Oswald (2004) or Ferrer-
i-Carbonell (2005). The pseudo-R2 is 0.083, which is in line with the literature, and with the
belief that only 8 to 20% of individual well-being depend on objective variables and hence can
be explained (Kahneman et al. 1999).
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like the ones decribed below. Then, in principle, we cannot disregard them at
this point of the study. However, the two variables non significant in Table
A2 (Supplementary material), higher educational degree earned and prestige,
remain non significant after the introduction of either of the two variables
capturing the social comparison effects, so we disregard them for the rest of
the study.
In Table A3 in Appendix 2 (see Supplementary material), I present the
average income of the different groups (the omitted base case is in capital
letters) which together with Table A2 (Supplementary material) contain in-
formation about the expected size of the coefficient capturing the correlated
effects. To simplify the explanation, let us take a binary Zi like race. If the
dummy variable for race takes the value zero when the individual is white,
then the negative coefficient for race in the first regression means that being
black is a disadvantage for happiness. However, since the average income of
white men is higher than the average income of black men, the same absolute
income is more likely to assure you a better relative income or position in
the income distribution of the black men. Then, there is an advantage in
social comparison terms of being black. This positive effect of being black
is not identified in the first regression and is included in the race coefficient
increasing its value. Therefore, we would expect a more negative coefficient
for race in the regression including the term of social comparisons.
On the contrary, if the dummy variable for gender takes the value zero
when the individual is female, then the negative coefficient for sex in the first
regression means that being male is a disadvantage for happiness. However, the
average income of males is higher than for females, then in social comparisons
terms is also worse to be a male. In the first regression this makes the sex
coefficient more negative, then in the regression including social effects we
would expect this coefficient to be less negative. And the same can be said for
all the Zi.
The estimation to identify the social comparison effects, either using the
ratio of incomes or the percentile (Eqs. 4 and 5), includes controls for income,
linear and quadratic,15 age, linear and quadratic, health, number of children,
dummy variables for sex, race, marital and work status, place of living, oc-
cupation, religion and political views,16 and finally dummies for region and
year of interview. Thus, every equation is run with all the possible Zi variables
included as controls in the γ´Zi term. The estimation is robust to region cluster
effects, since all other variables have individual variability.
In Table 1, I present the values of β, i.e., the marginal effects for the different
definitions of the reference groups using the first variable, the ratio of incomes
(Eq. 4). These effects are calculated at the sample mean of the continuous
15Since it is usually assumed that happiness is concave in income.
16The categories that are assigned a dummy variable and the category being the omitted base case
for every characteristic are listed in Appendix 1 (Supplementary material).
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Table 1 Value of β for different estimations of Eq. 4
Change in probability of answering Very Happy
Reference group defined by (i) (ii)
Age 0.0232
(0.00504)∗∗∗
City vs. country 0.0204 0.0221
(0.00519)∗∗∗ (0.00494)∗∗∗
Marital status 0.0225 0.023
(0.00516)∗∗∗ (0.00624)∗∗∗
Occupation 0.0222 0.0256
(0.00608)∗∗∗ (0.00555)∗∗∗
Political views 0.0206 0.0236
(0.00533)∗∗∗ (0.00475)∗∗∗
Race 0.0206 0.0205
(0.00687)∗∗∗ (0.00553)∗∗∗
Region 0.0206 0.0204
(0.00605)∗∗∗ (0.00406)∗∗∗
Religion 0.0205 0.0224
(0.00609)∗∗∗ (0.00561)∗∗∗
Sex 0.0205 0.0232
(0.00497)∗∗∗ (0.00526)∗∗∗
Work status 0.0192 0.0237
(0.00544)∗∗∗ (0.00617)∗∗∗
Standard errors in parentheses
Asterisks denote level of significance: ∗∗∗1%, ∗∗5%, ∗10%
Observations: 25,059; Pseudo R2 around 0.083
regressors and at the most frequent state for the dummy variables (which
corresponds to a married white male, working, protestant, independent and
living in the city). This table shows us the estimated change in the probability
of a respondent reporting that she is Very happy (Hi = 3) when her income
relative to her reference group defined by the different Zi increases by 100%.
To define the reference groups I impose a temporal restriction. I consider that
individuals interviewed in one year only compare themselves with individuals
interviewed in the same year. The first specification shown in the first column is
the broadest definition of the groups. The reference group is just the category
one belongs to for the different Zi in the same year. For example, a white man
living in 1990 compares with all the other white men living in 1990. To narrow
more the definition of the Joneses, I impose a second restriction for the second
specification. As will become clear later, the reference group defined by age is
the most significant and with the larger marginal effect, then I use age as the
second restriction defining the groups. Hence, the second specification delimits
the groups both temporarily and by age. The reference group is the category
one belongs to for the different Zi in the same year and in the same age group.
For example, a white man being thirty-six year old in 1990 compares with all
the other white men being between thirty and forty years old in 1990.
Note that the coefficient in each cell is the marginal effect of interest for a
different regression. As this occurs for all the tables in the paper (including
the Appendix (Supplementary material)) but for three, when it is not the
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case it is indicated in those three tables. As we expected all the effects are
positive, which means that the respondent is more likely to report she is
Very Happy when her relative income increases. All the effects are significant
at the 1% significance level. On the other hand, the marginal effects for
a respondent reporting that she is Not too happy (Hi = 1) are negative as
expected (see Table A4 in Appendix 2 (Supplementary material)), meaning
that when her relative income increases, the probability of answering Not too
happy diminishes. The a priori ambiguous effect on the intermediate answer is
always negative, which means that the marginal effect for the higher happiness
state is the larger.
In Table 2, I present the marginal effects using the second variable, the
percentile in the reference group income distribution (Eq. 5). As in the
previous table, the effects are calculated at the sample mean of the continuous
regressors and at the most frequent state for the dummy variables. The
direction and interpretation of the effects are the same as the previous table.
The marginal effect ∂ Pr(Hi = 3)/∂ F(yi/Zi) is positive for all the reference
groups and tells us that the respondent is more likely to report she is Very
Happy when she climbs up one percentile in the reference group income
distribution. As in the previous table, all the effects are significant at the 1%
significance level. These results add to an accumulating econometric literature
on relative income effects upon happiness.
Table 2 Value of β for different estimations of Eq. 5
Change in probability of answering Very Happy
Reference group defined by (i) (ii)
Age 0.00102
(0.00017)∗∗∗
City vs. country 0.00099 0.001
(0.00019)∗∗∗ (0.00012)∗∗∗
Marital status 0.00088 0.00088
(0.00019)∗∗∗ (0.00018)∗∗∗
Occupation 0.00085 0.0008
(0.00018)∗∗∗ (0.00019)∗∗∗
Political views 0.00099 0.00102
(0 .0002)∗∗∗ (0.00018)∗∗∗
Race 0.00092 0.00097
(0.0002)∗∗∗ (0.00018)∗∗∗
Region 0.00088 0.00083
(0.00019)∗∗∗ (0.00019)∗∗∗
Religion 0.00096 0.00095
(0.00022)∗∗∗ (0.00021)∗∗∗
Sex 0.00094 0.00097
(0.0002)∗∗∗ (0.00018)∗∗∗
Work status 0.00085 0.00089
(0.00017)∗∗∗ (0.00017)∗∗∗
Standard errors in parentheses
Asterisks denote level of significance: ∗∗∗1%, ∗∗5%, ∗10%
Observations: 25,059; Pseudo R2 around 0.083
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In Table A5 in Appendix 2 (see Supplementary material), I present the
direct effect on happiness of the different Zi in the corresponding regression
which includes the term of social effects for the groups defined by that Zi.
We can see that the size of these coefficients for all the Zi is in accordance
with what we expected looking at Tables A2 and A3 (see Supplementary
material). Besides, the effect of real income diminishes in all the estimations.
This decrease is consistent with the idea that money is not only valuable for its
intrinsic purchasing power but also as a signal of social position. This second
function of money is captured through my measure of social comparison
effects. In particular, the total income effect of 0.0039 diminishes to an average
of 0.0025 for the different estimations of Eq. 4, and to an average of 0.0016
for the different estimations of Eq. 5. From these results we can infer that the
‘status return’ from income ranges somewhere between two thirds and two
fifths of the total effect of income. This interval is not far from the findings
of the literature. For example, in the already mentioned Senik (2009) the
effect of absolute income is reduced to somewhere between the half and two
thirds (the coefficient diminishes from 0.27 to lower values ranging from 0.14
to 0.18) when the comparison effects are introduced. Similarly, Knight et al.
(2006), one of the best sources of information on the magnitude of social
comparisons, suggests that relative income is at least twice as important for
individual happiness as actual income.
5.2 Choosing the Joneses
We have seen that the variable capturing social comparison effects, either
the ratio of incomes or the percentile, is significant for all the reference
groups. This means that individuals compare themselves, and they compare
with people around them in the multiple dimensions of human life. However,
we want to find the Joneses. To select which of the characteristics that define
the reference groups are more relevant for social comparisons I evaluate their
relative importance in a similar way as Senik (2009).
Specifically I apply two criteria. First, I make a joint regression with the
relative income variables for all the reference groups defined. We eliminate
the less significant and repeat the joint regression with the variables not
eliminated. We repeat this procedure in a multistage fashion until ending up
with the groups always significant. We run, in other words, a horse race to
see which variables dominate. In Table A6 in Appendix 2 (see Supplementary
material), I present the results of the three joint regressions until keeping with
four reference groups always significant using the ratio of incomes. This is the
signif icance criterion. Second, I study for these groups the actual importance
of their effect on individual happiness. The magnitude of the marginal effects
determines the size criterion. Finally, I select the groups defined by character-
istics which satisfy both the signif icance and the size criteria.
Following these criteria, the reference groups defined by age, race, sex
and religion are the most important for social comparisons. Although the
twelve characteristics I selected to establish the reference groups were a priori
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attractive, these four are the main determinants of the Joneses. Being age
the primary feature defining the people one compares with, seems reasonable
since it is an immediate term of comparison. Besides, it is usually used in the
literature as an a priori imposed characteristic defining the reference groups
(McBride 2001 or Ferrer-i-Carbonell 2005). Race and sex are also two imme-
diate characteristics that may well serve as a primary definition of a person,
making them suitable for comparison. Though they are often mentioned in
the social psychology literature (Merton and Kitt 1950, Singer 1981; or Bylsma
and Major 1994), they are not so relevant in the economic literature. In a study
using South African data, Kingdon and Knight (2007) find race (along with
geographical proximity) as the characteristic defining the reference groups,
which they attribute precisely to the special context of the racially divided
South African society. The finding of religion as a characteristic defining
the reference group is new (to my knowledge) in economics. In the social
psychology literature, the relevance of religion in reference group theory has
been recognised in some studies (Bock et al. 1983; or Clarke et al. 1990).
The interpretation may be twofold. Firstly, religion provides an interpretive
framework by which an individual can make sense of her experience. Secondly,
the religion a person professes may be an important feature in her life, which
can lead to having more contact with people with the same beliefs. In the end,
one compares primarily with the people around oneself, which is consistent
with our findings.
I would like to narrow more the definition of the Joneses, and try combina-
tions of these features to find the most significant reference groups. However,
I deal with a sample limitation since, as already noted, the data are 25 different
cross sections of between 1,500 to 3,000 observations. In Table A7 and A8 in
Appendix 2 (see Supplementary material), I present the average and minimum
number of observations per group for the broadest definition of the groups
(i.e., the category one belongs to for the different Zi in the same year),
and once also delimited by age, for the group of people between thirty and
forty years,17 respectively. The number of observations for these groups (the
average ranging from three hundred to one hundred for most of the categories)
makes me confident that the relative income measures reflect the income
distribution in every group. However, if I combine further these characteristics
by adding a third feature to define the reference group, the overly small
number of observations per group would make any measure of relative income
not to be representative.
To understand the importance of social comparisons for individual happi-
ness, the relative income coefficient has to be put into perspective. In order to
do that, the relative income effect on happiness is compared with the effect of
other variables. In Table 3 we can see the impact in the higher happiness state
of increasing one percentile in the income distribution of the reference group
17For the other four age groups the number of observations is similar.
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Table 3 Relative size of the marginal effects using race as reference group
Change in probability of answering Very Happy
(i) (ii)
Percentile (race) 0.00092 0.00097
(0.0002)∗∗∗ (0.00018)∗∗∗
Real income ($1,000) 0.00158 0.00147
(0.00054)∗∗∗ (0.00056)∗∗∗
Widowed −0.169 −0.168
(0.00728)∗∗∗ (0.0075)∗∗∗
Divorced −0.152 −0.151
(0.0091)∗∗∗ (0.00893)∗∗∗
In this table the cells in the same column correspond to the same regression
Standard errors in parentheses
Asterisks denote level of significance: ∗∗∗1%, ∗∗5%, ∗10%
Observations: 25,059; Pseudo R2 around 0.083
defined by race, compared with the impact of increasing individual income by
1,000 dollars and with the impact of two major life events: becoming divorced
or widowed (which corresponds to a discrete change in the respective dummy
variable from 0 to 1).
The relative size of any two coefficients provides information about the
relative relevance of the variables. Normalising the coefficients, we see that the
effect of climbing one percentile in the reference group income distribution
has an impact of around 0.6 times the impact of an additional 1,000 dollars.
This means that, concerning happiness, a one percentile increase in the income
distribution of the reference group defined by race is equivalent to receiving
around 600 dollars.
However, both the income and the relative income effects are small com-
pared with the effect of becoming divorced or widowed. The influence of
these non-economic variables in happiness is huge. The effect of these major
life events is roughly 100 times (more for widowhood and less for divorce)
the effect of the additional 1,000 dollars, while it is roughly 160 times the
effect of one percentile jump. Nonetheless, these calculations should be treated
cautiously because it is difficult to establish cause and effect with many of the
variables that are at play, and in many cases they may interact.18 In other
words, are married people happier, or are happier people more likely to get
married? Are wealthier people happier, or are happier people more likely to
be successful and earn more income over time? This possibility of reverse
causation is an important problem, which anyway is common throughout
applied economics.
18Besides, the effects of becoming divorced or widowed probably depend on the time passed since
the event took place, which is not taken into account in these calculations. However, I think these
comparisons to be illustrative of the size of the coefficients.
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The literature on happiness has addressed this issue, especially in panel data
analysis,19 and mostly suggests that causation indeed runs from marriage or
income to happiness. There is a separate literature in which it is concluded
that marriage seems to provide a protective effect to mental well-being (see,
for example, Cochrane 1996). Argyle (1999) contains further discussion of this
evidence, and also argues for the casual effects of labour status or religion
on happiness. In order to test the direction of causation in the income-
happiness relationship, the effect of windfalls determining income has been
analysed. British lottery winners and people receiving an inheritance reported
higher satisfaction scores in the following year (Gardner and Oswald 2001; or
Brickman et al. 1978), which suggests causality from income to happiness.20
In any case, I believe that at this point in the history of happiness research
there is no unambiguous proof about the direction of causality. Therefore,
along the paper I am circumspect about causation. In the future, a better
understanding of the direction of causality and the causes of happiness will
provide a more secure foundation for policy recommendations.
5.3 For whom relative income is more important
To answer the question for whom relative income is more important, Eqs. 4
and 5 have been estimated allowing for interactions with characteristics that
define different groups of people. Since the binary categories are the most
significative for this type of analysis, I have made the estimation for the
characteristics that divide the sample in two groups: sex (female and male),
race (whites and blacks) and place of living (living in the country and living in
the city). Then, the regression to identify the groups of people for which social
comparisons are more important is:
Hi = θyi + β1 yiE(yi/Zi) + β2
yi
E(yi/Zi)
1(Zi = k) + γ´Zi + η´xi + εi (6)
where k = 0, 121 for the two values of Zi. Then if β2 is significant, it means that
the coefficients associated with the two groups defined by Zi are different. If
β2 is positive the effect of relative income on the group defined by Zi = 1 is
greater. The contrary is true if β2 is negative.
As we can see in Table 4, the effect of social comparisons via income is
lower for black people, for women and for people living in the city. It can
be surprising that social comparison effects are larger for people living in the
19In panel analysis it is possible to consider a specific baseline well-being for each individual.
See, for example, Winkelmann and Winkelmann (1998). However, as discussed in Frey and
Stutzer (2002), the direction of causality cannot easily be identified even in a panel data analysis.
Additional information from qualitative studies, or in the form of instrumental variables, may be
necessary.
20However, in the long run these effects on happiness are of minor importance.
21k = 0 and then β1 captures all the effect for people living in the country, for females and for
white people.
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Table 4 Values of β1 and β2 in the estimation of Eq. 6
Change in probability of answering Very Happy
Reference groups (i) (ii)
City vs. country β1 0.0265 0.0284
(0.00578)∗∗∗ (0.00613)∗∗∗
β2 −0.0094 −0.0095
(0.00285)∗∗∗ (0.0031)∗∗∗
Sex β1 0.0204 0.0258
(0.00431)∗∗∗ (0.00461)∗∗∗
β2 0.0102 0.0108
(0.00363)∗∗∗ (0.00377)∗∗∗
Race β1 0.0264 0.0275
(0.0056)∗∗∗ (0.00542)∗∗∗
β2 −0.0247 −0.0244
(0.00566)∗∗∗ (0.00603)∗∗∗
Standard errors in parentheses
Asterisks denote level of significance: ∗∗∗1%, ∗∗5%, ∗10%
Observations: 25,059; Pseudo R2 around 0.083
country. A possible explanation could be that when living in a little village
the contact with neighbours is more frequent, and the information about their
income is better, which could make comparison effects larger.
5.4 Robustness checks
I have done a number of robustness checks to test the validity of the results.
As already explained, the number of observations for each group is a crucial
limitation in this study and may call into question the reliability of the relative
income variable. In order to deal with this problem, I have tried two different
ways of increasing the number of observations per group.
The research posed thus far assumes contemporaneous effects. It may well
be more realistic to assume some lag in the transmission of these effects. Then,
the third specification allows an individual to compare both with people living
in the same year or the year before. This doubles the number of observations
for every group (but for the ones living in 1972). Then, the reference group is
the category one belongs to for the different Zi in the same year or the year
before. For example, a white man living in 1990 compares with all the other
white men living in 1990 or 1989.
The fourth specification compress the categories of Zi, making every Zi
(except age and region which seemed little sensible) a binary variable. This
increases the number of observations per group which had more than two
categories in the previous specifications. The table for these new specifications
using the ratio of incomes is in Table A9 in Appendix 2 (see Supplementary
material).
For all the specifications, and for all the reference groups, the marginal
effects on the probability of a respondent reporting that she is Very happy
are positive and significant at the 1% level. On the other hand, the marginal
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effects for a respondent reporting that she is Not too happy are negative
and significant at the 1% level. As in the previous specifications, the a priori
ambiguous effect on the intermediate answer is always negative, thus again,
the marginal effect for the higher happiness state is the larger. The results for
the two criteria used to select the Joneses are also quite robust for the different
specifications, so I am more confident with their reliability.
The remaining specifications, from the fifth to the eighth are just a com-
bination of the previous ones (and the results are also in Table A9; see
Supplementary material). The fifth specification just combines the second and
the third. The reference group is the category one belongs to for the different
Zi in the same year or the year before, and in the same age group. The sixth
specification just combines the third and the fourth. The reference group is
one of the two categories an individual belongs to for the different Zi in the
same year or the year before. The seventh specification combines the second,
the third and the fourth. The reference group is one of the two categories an
individual belongs to for the different Zi in the same year or the year before,
and in the same age group. Finally, the eight specification delimits the groups
both temporarily and geographically. The reference group is the category one
belongs to for the different Zi in the same year and in the same region.
Finally, I construct a third variable for relative income replacing the per-
centiles for their corresponding values in the normal cumulative distribu-
tion function. The sign and significance of the marginal effects for all the
specifications and for all the reference groups confirm the results obtained
with the two previous variables of relative income, as shown in Table A10 in
Appendix 2 (see Supplementary material). The normal cumulative distribution
function fulfils perfectly the non-linearity condition of g(yi, Zi) necessary for
identification, as discussed in Subsection 4.1. Thus, the outcomes using this
third variable of relative income are especially relevant to asses the robustness
of the previous results.
6 Model for labour supply
In the first part of the paper we have found that relative income is a significant
variable in determining individual happiness. Its effect is positive which in-
dicates relative status considerations. If these benefits of moving up in the
income hierarchy are high enough, we could expect that individuals were
willing to increase the amount of labour they supply in the labour market.
The hours worked by an individual have a positive effect on her income and
a negative effect on her happiness. So, when not taken into account, it can
lead to the false conclusion that income does not increase happiness, and
could then explain the Easterlin paradox. Besides, despite the sharp increase
in consumption levels, labour supply22 has not declined much over the past
22Especially in the US, where our data come from (Schor 1992).
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100 years. The influence of social comparisons on labour supply decisions
could reconcile these two facts. Therefore, in this section we are going to
test if relative income affects the individual decision of labour supply. Is the
income of the Joneses a significant variable to explain the number of hours an
individual works?
We take up again our model in which utility depends on both absolute and
relative consumption:
u(ci, ci, xi) (7)
As standard in the literature, we introduce the relative income hypothesis
in a simple way, assuming that households derive utility from the difference of
their consumption with respect to the consumption of the Joneses.
c˜i = ci − bc
c˜i is as measure of effective consumption, the consumption which really
determines individual’s utility, and b is a measure of the importance given
to social comparisons. Particularly, b is the weight of relative consumption in
effective consumption since if we add and substract bci, effective consumption
becomes c˜i = (1 − b)ci + b(ci − ci).
Then, the utility function depends on effective consumption (˜ci) and hours
worked (li). We would expect u to be increasing and concave in its first
argument and decreasing and convex in the second.
We use a standard definition of the keeping up with the Joneses utility
functions23 which include both absolute and relative income as its arguments.
u = (ci − bci)
1−γ − 1
1 − γ − λli (8)
We maximise this utility function with respect to hours, subject to the
budget constraint, ci = wili where wi is wage, which may be different for the
different individuals. Taking the FOC for hours worked we get the optimal
labour/leisure decision:
∂u
∂li
= wi(wili − bci)−γ − λ = 0
l∗i =
w
(1−γ )/γ
i
λ1/γ
+ bci
wi
(9)
23For example, this is the function used in Ljungqvist and Uhlig (2000). In their model, which
assumes that leisure is purely non-positional as I do, the externality of other’s people consumption
leads to a labour supply that is too high. They show that the task of tax policy is to undo the
effect of this consumption externality and that can be accomplished by taxing consumption at a
flat marginal rate, independent of the business cycle.
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The effects of both the importance given to social comparisons and the
income of the Joneses on labour supply are positive.
∂l∗i
∂b
= ci
wi
> 0 (10)
∂l∗i
∂ci
= b
wi
> 0 (11)
It means that the more you compare yourself to the Joneses or the richer
they are, the more you are going to work to surpass, catch or keep up with
them.
In short, this simple model just shows a standard assertion: if the income
of the Joneses or the importance given to social comparisons go up, effective
consumption decreases, increasing its marginal utility. Since the optimal
labour/leisure decision equates marginal utilities of consumption and leisure,
this raises the marginal utility of leisure, diminishing the marginal utility of
labour, and thus increasing the number of hours worked.
This model provides testable implications. We can test in the data whether
social comparisons affect the number of hours worked. Since we do not have
data for wages we substitute its expression derived from the budget constraint,
wi = ci/ li, into the FOC for hours worked. Besides, multiplying and dividing
the second member of this condition by c−γi we get:
l∗i =
c1−γi
λ[1 − b(ci/ci)−1]γ (12)
In a one-period model, or in a model without savings, income equals
consumption (ci = yi), so that Eq. 13 can be understood as a linearised version
of the optimal decision for hours worked in Eq. 12.
Li = κyi + α yiE(yi/Zi) + ν´Zi + ρ´xi´ + ξi (13)
where Li is number of hours worked by an individual, yi is her own income,
E(yi/Zi) is the income of her reference group and xi´ are other determinants
of hours worked. We can see that in Eq. 13 our first measure of social
comparisons appears: the income of the individual divided by the income of
her reference group. We expect α to be significantly different from zero for
the groups selected in the first part.
Before going on to present the results, two issues deserve comment. First,
if Eq. 13 included the average hours worked by the reference group—
E(Li/Zi)—as a determinant of hours worked by an individual, there would
be a problem of identification due to the presence of endogenous effects (the
so-called reflection problem, Manski 1993). Nonetheless, the standard model
of labour supply24 does not include this kind of interdependent behaviour. The
24See, for example, Cahuc and Zylberberg (2004).
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great majority of empirical labour supply studies25 do not incorporate hours of
work of the reference group as a determinant of hours worked.26 Furthermore,
the evidence of the non-positional aspect of leisure commented in Subsection
4.1 supports this exclusion.
Second, in this regression there is a potential problem of endogeneity since
the income of the individual may well be correlated with the error term.
Unobserved characteristics I cannot control for which affect hours worked
such as individual laziness, hard-working or productivity can have an effect on
individual income. Although the problem would be worse if we used individual
wage, we must take into account this possible endogeneity. Thus, I use data for
family income instead of individual income, both for the regressor (yi) and for
the construction of the variable of relative income ( yiE(yi/Zi) ). Family income is
supposed to have a weaker relation, if any, with the error term of the equation.
7 Results for labour supply
We have estimated Eq. 13 for the reference groups selected in the first part: the
groups defined by age, race, sex and religion. The purpose of the regression
is not to estimate a state of the art labour supply function, but simply to
verify if the basic pattern implied by the model is supported by the data. The
dependent variable is hours worked and the explanatory variables include a
list of variables typically found in studies of labour supply (Park 2005). Hence
the estimation includes controls for family income, linear and quadratic, age,
number of children, dummies for sex, race, place of living, occupation, marital
status and education, dummies for part-time job, working for oneself and
union membership, and dummies for region and year of interview. Since we
include sex, race and age as regressors, we can see again the double effect
of Zi on the dependent variable (Li in this case) which requires the two
conditions for the variables capturing the social comparison effects mentioned
in the identification discussion for the first part. However, since the variable
capturing the social comparison effects is the same as in the first part, these
two conditions are already satisfied.
We present the results in Table 5. The effects are in accordance with the
theoretical model. The negative sign for the coefficient associated with relative
income implies that the lower is your relative income, the more hours you are
going to work. For three out of four reference groups, the ones defined by
age, race and sex, the coefficient is significative at the ten per cent level. In
the second specification used in this paper, joining age with the other three
features, the results remain negative and significant at the one per cent level.
25For a general overview, see the survey in Blundell and MaCurdy (1999).
26Blomquist (1993) and Aronsson et al. (1999) are two exceptions which show that if individual
labor supply is influenced by average labour supply and this interdependence is not taken into
account, it can lead to a serious bias in the predicted effects of a tax change.
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Table 5 Effects of relative income on hours worked
Reference groups defined by (i) (ii)
Age −0.7895
(0.3203)∗∗
Sex −4.0581 −1.5785
(0.8297)∗∗∗ (0.3246)∗∗∗
Race −0.8744 −1.1841
(0.5297)∗ (0.2911)∗∗∗
Religion 0.0012 −1.2608
(0.5808) (0.2847)∗∗∗
Standard errors in parentheses
Asterisks denote level of significance: ∗∗∗1%, ∗∗5%, ∗10%
Observations: 15,743; R-squared around 0.417
However, the size of the effects is very small. For example, if the income
relative to the reference group defined by race decreases by 10%, the number
of hours worked per week increases by 0,08744, which is less than six additional
minutes per week. For the reference group defined by sex the effect is larger, a
10% decrease in relative income implies around twenty five additional minutes
per week.27
The limited size of the effect may be due to the fact that individuals
cannot choose exactly the number of hours they work. However, in the
standard labour supply model, working hours derived from the first order
condition from utility maximisation subject to the budget constraint, imply
the assumption that the individual’s choice set covers all possible working
hours up to a maximum equal to the time endowment. This assumption does
not necessarily mean that the individual has a free choice of hours with his
current employer, but rather that the feasible set of jobs for the individual
presents a free choice of hours. Individuals can move to employers who
offer hours closer to their preferences, and employers who offer unpopular
hours will have difficulties recruiting or retaining workers. Thus mobility will
reduce the possible divergence among desired and observed hours of work.28
Nonetheless, taking into account the possibility that individuals cannot choose
exactly how many hours they work, I look at the effect of relative income on
two other labour supply decisions. First, the transition from a part-time job
to a full-time job. Second, the participation decision into the labour force.29
The results are shown in Tables 6 and 7, respectively. In both cases the results
27However, in this case the assumption that κ is the same for males and females could be non
satisfactory since the marginal effect of family income on hours worked could be different for men
and women.
28In support of this assumption of the standard labour supply model, Böheim and Taylor (2004),
using subjective data on desired hours of work from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS)
find that men and women are able to adjust their working hours in line with preferences. They also
show that workers have more possibilities to increase their working hours within the job than to
reduce them, which makes it easier to keep up with the Joneses working more hours.
29The controls are the same as in the previous estimation excluding the dummies for part-time job
and union membership, which had no sense in these estimations.
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Table 6 Effects of relative income on part-time vs. full-time job decision
Reference groups defined by (i) (ii)
Age −0.0986
(0.0069)∗∗∗
Sex −0.1755 −0.1006
(0.0183)∗∗∗ (0.0071)∗∗∗
Race −0.0365 −0.0757
(0.0172)∗∗ (0.0066)∗∗∗
Religion 0.0295 −0.0727
(0.0184) (0.0064)∗∗∗
Standard errors in parentheses
Asterisks denote level of significance: ∗∗∗1%, ∗∗5%, ∗10%
Observations: 24,576; Pseudo R2 around 0.124
are consistent with the keeping up with the Joneses hypothesis. The negative
sign indicates that the lower is your relative income, the higher probability of
becoming a full-time worker and of entering the labour force. The effects are
significant at the ten per cent level for all the groups but for the one defined
by religion (and only for the part-time vs. full-time decision). For the second
specification, all the effects are significant at the one per cent level.
Notwithstanding, given the potential problems commented in the previous
section, I feel that these estimates of the relative income effect should be
interpreted carefully. Nevertheless, the estimates of the three labour supply
decisions coincide in signaling the significant effect of relative income, and
the direction of this effect points directly to keeping up with the Joneses
considerations. Thus, I do believe that my results support the idea that social
comparisons have an influence on labour supply.
A final test to assess the validity of the results is to see if the groups of people
for whom relative income is more relevant in determining their happiness, are
also more influenced by relative income in their decisions of hours worked.
Remember that to answer the question for whom relative income is more
important, I estimated Eq. 6, a version of Eq. 4 which included a term of
interaction. To analyse if some groups are more influenced by relative income
Table 7 Effects of relative income on labour participation decision
Reference groups defined by (i) (ii)
Age −0.2476
(0.0101)∗∗∗
Sex −0.3280 −0.2622
(0.0248)∗∗∗ (0.0102)∗∗∗
Race −0.0371 −0.2005
(0.0204)∗ (0.0090)∗∗∗
Religion −0.0454 −0.2113
(0.0211)∗∗ (0.0091)∗∗∗
Standard errors in parentheses
Asterisks denote level of significance: ∗∗∗1%, ∗∗5%, ∗∗∗10%
Observations: 37,961; Pseudo R2 around 0.236
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Table 8 Values of α1 and α2 in the estimation of Eq. 14 (and β1 and β2 from Table 4)
Reference groups (i) (ii) (i) (ii)
City vs. country β1 0.0265 0.0284 α1 −1.083 −1.473
(0.00578)∗∗∗ (0.00613)∗∗∗ (1.164) (0.359)∗∗∗
β2 −0.0094 −0.0095 α2 0.344 0.388
(0.00285)∗∗∗ (0.0031)∗∗∗ (0.214)∗ (0.144)∗∗∗
Sex β1 0.0204 0.0258 α1 −1.638 −1.706
(0.00431)∗∗∗ (0.00461)∗∗∗ (0.608)∗∗∗ (0.319)∗∗∗
β2 0.0102 0.0108 α2 −1.278 −1.080
(0.00363)∗∗∗ (0.00377)∗∗∗ (0.279)∗∗∗ (0.213)∗∗∗
Race β1 0.0264 0.0275 α1 −2.311 −1.312
(0.0056)∗∗∗ (0.00542)∗∗∗ (1.26)∗ (0.322)∗∗∗
β2 −0.0247 −0.0244 α2 0.682 0.383
(0.00566)∗∗∗ (0.00603)∗∗∗ (0.533) (0.305)
Standard errors in parentheses
Asterisks denote level of significance: ∗∗∗1%, ∗∗5%, ∗10%
Observations: 25,059; Pseudo R2 around 0.083 for happiness regressions
Observations: 15,743; R2 around 0.417 for hours regressions
in their decisions of hours worked, I proceed analogously with the labour
equation.
Li = κyi + α1 yiE(yi/Zi) + α2
yi
E(yi/Zi)
1(Zi = k) + ν´Zi + ρ´xi´ + ξi (14)
where k = 0, 1 for the two values of the binary variables Zi. Then if α2
is significant, it means that the coefficients associated with the two groups
defined by Zi are different. If α2 is negative the effect of relative income on
the group defined by Zi = 1 is greater (note that α1 is negative). The contrary
is true if α2 is positive.
The results shown in Table 8 support our hypothesis. The signs of β2 and α2
are opposed. Negative β2 in the first stage implies positive α2 in the second.
It means that the groups less worried about the Joneses in their happiness
equation (negative β2) tend to work less due to social comparison effects
(positive α2 which diminishes the negative effect of relative income on hours
worked). This happens for women, black people, and people living in the
city; while the contrary is true for men, white people and people living in the
country. Therefore, this final test supports the validity of the previous results
of the paper.
8 Conclusions
Despite being ignored for many years in the agenda of economics, happiness
research has awakened. The recent outpouring of economic research on this
subject is making its main conclusions becoming familiar ground. One of these
is that relative income is a significant variable in determining individual happi-
ness. My results add to an accumulating econometric literature on the negative
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effect of reference group income upon happiness, which is attributed to social
comparisons. People compare themselves to others. These comparisons30 have
an effect on individual behaviour. The main result of this paper is that it shows
that relative income not only affects subjective well-being, but also labour
supply decisions.
Before testing the importance of relative income on labour supply, it is cru-
cial to find with what other people such comparisons are being made. Thus in
the first part of the paper, the main characteristics defining the reference group
one looks onto when making social comparisons are identified. The reference
group is primarily defined by age, while other relevant features are race, sex
and religion. The next natural step in the research could be to precise more
the definition of the reference group.31 Surveys which contain direct questions
about the composition of the reference groups or more complete data bases
may help to address this challenge. In the same vein, how reference groups
are formed and dissolved is a complicated issue that I hope will be explored
in the future. In this line, Falk and Knell (2004) show in their model that the
endogenously-chosen reference standards increase with individual ability, and
thus people tend to compare themselves to similar others. Individuals may play
an active role in the choice of their reference group, which may serve motives
of self-improvement or self-enhancement.
In the second part of the paper I provide evidence, in the framework of
a standard keeping up with the Joneses model, that status concerns affect the
number of hours worked. If your relative income or position in your reference
group is low, you will work more to surpass, catch or keep up with the Joneses.
The effect of relative income on both happiness and hours worked is higher for
males, white people and people living in rural areas. The consistency of these
results gives support to the reliability of the happiness data used and the results
obtained in the first part.
The influence of positional concerns in labour supply decisions may help
to explain the Easterlin paradox, since hours worked increase income as well
as decrease happiness. Besides, it is a valid reason why labour supply has
not declined dramatically in the present and last century, despite the very
significant rise in consumption levels. Following this line, the labour supply
implications of relative income pose potential policy questions.
30Some call these comparisons envy, but they are probably best thought of as a desire to exceed, or
at least keep up with relevant others. Whatever the psychological cause beneath, I provide support
for their relevance on labour supply decisions.
31Once the characteristics of the reference group are identified, additional precisions could be
done in a double vertical dimension. First, social comparison effects may change along the income
distribution. Relative income effects may be stronger for those with higher income as McBride
(2001) suggests. Second, social comparison effects may change over the course of the life cycle. At
the beginning of an individual’s life, social comparisons may play a larger role in her happiness
and behaviour, while later in life, personal experience may become more important.
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A blooming literature,32 mainly theoretical, has addressed the optimal
tax implications of utility functions which depend on relative income. The
importance of relative income on individual utility leads to a status race, which
can be perceived as self-defeating since if I do better someone else must be
doing worse, and can lead to sub-optimal outcomes if it crowds-out non-status
activities. Since leisure is considered a non-status activity,33 they obtain a ratio-
nale for income taxation in order to promote leisure. In other words, if we live
in a Veblenian world with social comparisons, one person’s increase in income
has a negative externality on others because it lowers their relative income.
Thus, the fight for relative positions is socially wasteful, and labour should be
more heavily taxed to internalise the negative externality imposed on others.
I believe that the empirical results of the second part of my paper strengthen
the idea that relative income entails labour supply implications, thus providing
support to the theoretical arguments of this literature. However, the number of
empirical studies is still quite small, and much research is certainly warranted
to increase our understanding of how relative income affects labour supply
decisions. For example, the importance of the externality may depend on the
structure of the reference groups (who cares about whom), their size, or to
what extent they are affected. Future studies on these and related topics would
help determine the extent to which the findings from this research should be
incorporated into policy analysis.
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